










About thirty years ago, a number of philosophers of action were urging a naturalist turn in action theory. This turn did not happen. My aim is to argue that if we accept a not too controversial claim about the centrality of mental states that are not normally available to introspection (that I call pragmatic representations) in bringing about actions, we have strong reasons to naturalize action theory. 
The most important proponent of the naturalization of action theory was Myles Brand. In Brand (1984), he argued that philosophy of action should enter its ‘third stage’ (the first one was in the 1950s and 60s, the second in the 70s), the main mark of which would be its continuity with the empirical sciences. Brand’s methodology for philosophy of action is a package deal. He endorses the following three guidelines for the methodology that action theorists should follow: 

a.	Philosophy of action should be continuous with the empirical sciences 
b.	Philosophy of action should not privilege intentional actions
c.	Philosophy of action should be independent from ethics/moral philosophy

The last thirty years of philosophy of action could be described as doing the exact opposite of what Brand suggested. Contemporary philosophy of action is almost entirely about intentional actions (and not actions in general), and it is far from being independent from ethics/moral philosophy: in fact it has (with some rare exceptions) virtually become part of ethics/moral philosophy. Most importantly, contemporary philosophy of action is not, generally speaking, a naturalist enterprise: it consistently ignores empirical findings about actions and their mental antecedents: it has no patience for the cognitive neuroscience of action, for example.​[2]​ 
Interestingly, however, a similar naturalist turn (or, at least a half-turn) did occur in contemporary philosophy of perception. More and more contemporary philosophers of perception seem to have very similar methodological commitments to the ones enumerated above (see also Nanay 2010a): 

a'.	Contemporary philosophy of perception takes empirical vision science very seriously
b'.	Contemporary philosophy of perception tends not to privilege conscious perception
c'.	Contemporary philosophy of perception tends to be independent from epistemology

In recent years, paying close attention to empirical findings about perception seems to be the norm, rather than the exception. What this means is not that philosophy of perception has become theoretical vision science. Rather, philosophical arguments about perception are constrained by, and sometimes supported by, empirical evidence. Even in the case of some of the most genuinely philosophical debates, such as the representationalism versus relationalism debate or the debate about perceptual phenomenology, many of wthe arguments use empirical findings as premises (see, e.g., Pautz 2010, Nanay forthcoming and Bayne 2009, Nanay 2012b, respectively). And the fact that many of these empirical findings are about non-conscious perceptual processes shifts the emphasis away from conscious perceptual experience.  
Epistemology has always had special ties to philosophy of perception, traditionally because of the role perception is supposed to play in justification. But in contemporary philosophy of perception, perception is no longer interesting only inasmuch as it can tell us something about knowledge. Quite the contrary: epistemological considerations are often used to answer intrinsically-interesting questions about perception.​[3]​ 
The general picture that these methodological commitments outline is one where philosophy of perception is an autonomous field of philosophy that has important ties to other fields but does not depend on them and that is sensitive to the empirical findings of vision science. And this is very similar to the picture that Brand envisaged for philosophy of action but that never in fact materialized. 
My aim is to argue that since the mental states that make actions actions are not normally accessible to introspection, naturalized action theory is the only plausible option. Philosophy of action should turn toward philosophy of perception for some methodological support (see also Nanay 2013a). As pragmatic representations are both perceptual states and the representational components of the immediate mental antecedents of action, it is the joint job of philosophy of action and philosophy of perception to characterize them. And I will argue that this can only be done by relying on the empirical sciences. 

1. Naturalism about action theory
I need to be explicit about what I take to be naturalism about action theory. I have been talking about sensitivity to empirical results, but this is only part of what naturalism entails. The most important naturalist slogan since Quine has been the continuity between science and philosophy. As Quine says, 

I admit to naturalism and even glory in it. This means banishing the dream of a first philosophy and pursuing philosophy rather as a part of one’s system of the world, continuous with the rest of science (Quine 1984, pp. 430-431). 

Naturalism in the context of philosophy of action can be, and has been, formulated in a similar manner. Brand, for example, talks about ‘the integration of the philosophical with the scientific’ (Brand 1984, p. x). 
Just what this ‘continuity’ or ‘integration’ is supposed to mean, however, remains unclear. More specifically, what happens if what science tells us is in conflict with what folk psychology tells us? Brand clearly hands the decisive vote to folk psychology. As he says “Scientific psychology is not free to develop any arbitrary conceptual scheme; it is constrained by the conceptual base of folk psychology” (Brand 1984, p. 239). But that has little to do with naturalism, as Slezak (1987, 1989) points out (see especially the detailed point by point analysis of how Brand’s naturalism fails on its own terms in Slezak 1989, pp. 140-141, pp. 161-163). If the only role science is supposed to play in action theory is to fill in the details of the preexistent, unchangeable conceptual framework of folk psychology, then science is not playing a very interesting role at all—the conceptual framework of action theory would still be provided by folk psychology. Brand’s theory, in spite of its false advertisement, is not naturalistic in any sense of the term that would do justice to the Quinean slogan. 
What would then constitute a naturalized action theory? We can use Brand’s original formulation as a starting point: naturalized action theory urges the integration of the philosophical with the scientific, but a very specific kind of integration: one where the philosophical does not automatically trump the scientific. If it turns out that some of our key folk psychological concepts in philosophy of action (like those of ‘action’ or ‘intention’) fail to pick out any natural kinds, we have to replace them with concepts that do pick out natural kinds.​[4]​ And science can tell us what this new concept should be. 
I talked about the importance of empirical findings in naturalized action theory: empirical findings constrain the philosophical theories of action we can plausibly hold. But the interaction between philosophy and the empirical sciences is bi-directional. The philosophical hypotheses and theories, as a result of being empirically informed, should be specific enough to be falsified or verified by further empirical studies. Psychologists and neuroscientists often accuse philosophers in general, and philosophers of mind in particular, of providing theories that are too general and abstract: that are of no use for the empirical sciences. Philosophers of a non-naturalistic creed are of course free to do so, but if we want to preserve the naturalistic insight that philosophy should be continuous with the empirical sciences, such disconnect would not be permissible. Thus, naturalistic philosophy needs to give exact, testable hypotheses that psychologists as well as cognitive neuroscientists of action can engage with. Naturalized action theory, besides using empirical studies, could also be used for future empirical research. This is the only sense in which the ‘integration of the philosophical with the scientific’ that Brand talked about does not become a mere slogan. And this is the methodology that has been used by more and more philosophers of perception (I won’t pretend that it has been used by all of them), and, given the extremely rich body of empirical research, especially in the cognitive neuroscience of action,​[5]​ more and more philosophers of action should use the same methodology. 
This may sound like a manifesto about how nice naturalized action theory would be. But the aim of this section is to argue that it is difficult to see how naturalized action theory can be avoided. The sketch of the argument is the following: pragmatic representations, the mental states that make actions actions, are not normally accessible to introspection. But then we have no other option but to turn to the empirical sciences if we want to characterize and analyze them. 

2. Pragmatic representations
One of the most important questions of philosophy of action (or, maybe even the most ‘fundamental question’, see Bach 1978, Brand 1979) is the following: What makes actions actions? How do actions differ from mere bodily movements? What is the difference between performing the action of raising my hand and having the bodily movement of my hand going up (maybe as a result of a neuroscientist manipulating my motor cortex)? In short, what makes actions more than just bodily movements? Given that the bodily movement in these two cases is the same, whatever it is that makes the difference, it seems to be a plausible assumption that what makes actions actions is a mental state that triggers, guides or maybe accompanies, the bodily movements. If bodily movements are triggered (or guided, or accompanied) by mental states of a certain kind, they qualify as actions. If they are not, they are mere bodily movements.​[6]​ 
The big question is of course what mental states are the ones that trigger (or guide, or accompany) actions. And there is no consensus about what these mental antecedents of actions are supposed to be. But whatever they are, they seem to be representational states that attribute properties the representation of which is necessary for the performance of the action. They guide, and sometimes even monitor, our bodily movements. Myles Brand called mental states of this kind ‘immediate intentions’ (Brand 1984), Kent Bach calls them ‘executive representations’ (Bach 1978), John Searle ‘intentions-in-action’ (Searle 1983), Ruth Millikan ‘goal state representation’ (Millikan 2004, Chapter 16), and Marc Jeannerod ‘representation of goals for actions’ or ‘visuomotor representations’ (Jeannerod 1994, Section 5, Jeannerod 1997, Jacob-Jeannerod 2003: 202-204). I myself called them ‘action-oriented perceptual states’ (Nanay 2012a) or ‘action-guiding perceptual representations’ (Nanay 2011).​[7]​ Here, I will just use the place holder term ‘the immediate mental antecedent of actions’. 
I use the term ‘the immediate mental antecedent of actions’ as a mere place-holder for the mental state that makes actions actions: that is present when our bodily movement counts as action but is absent in the case of reflexes and other mere bodily movements. Thus, we can talk about the ‘immediate mental antecedents of actions’ in the case of all actions. Intentional actions have immediate mental antecedents, but so do non-intentional actions. And autonomous intentional actions have immediate mental antecedents as much as non-autonomous actions (see Velleman 2000, Hornsby 2004). 
As immediate mental antecedents of action are what makes actions actions, understanding the nature of these mental states is a logically prior task for philosophers of action to all other questions in action theory. In order to even set out to answer questions like ‘What makes actions intentional?’ or ‘What makes actions autonomous?’, one needs to have an answer to the question ‘What makes actions actions?’. And the way to answer this question is to describe the immediate mental antecedents of action. 
Many philosophers of action make a distinction between two different components of the immediate mental antecedent of actions. Kent Bach differentiates ‘receptive representations’ and ‘effective representations’ that together make up ‘executive representations’, which is his label for the immediate mental antecedent of action (Bach 1978, see especially p. 366). Myles Brand talks about the cognitive and the conative components of ‘immediate intentions’ as he calls the immediate mental antecedent of action (Brand 1984, p. 45). Leaving the specifics of these accounts behind, the general insight is that the immediate mental antecedent of action has two distinct components: one that represents the world in a certain way, and one that moves us to act. These two components can come apart but the immediate mental antecedent of actions consists of both (at least in most cases).​[8]​ 
I want to focus on the representational component of the immediate mental antecedent of actions. I call these mental states ‘pragmatic representations’ (see Nanay 2013a, 2013b). Thus, it is true by definition that in order to perform an action, we must have a pragmatic representation. But having a pragmatic representation does not necessarily manifest in an action, as it is the conative component of the mental antecedent of actions that moves us to act and if we have the representational, but not the conative component of the immediate mental antecedent of action, then the action is not performed. 
Pragmatic representations are genuine mental representations: they represent objects as having a number of properties that are relevant for performing the action. As a result, pragmatic representations can be correct or incorrect. If they are correct, they are more likely to guide our actions well; if they are incorrect, they are more likely to guide our actions badly. 
What properties do pragmatic representations represent objects as having? Suppose that you want to pick up a cup. In order to perform this action, you need to represent the cup as having a certain spatial location, otherwise you would have no idea which direction to reach out towards. You also need to represent it as having a certain size, otherwise you could not approach it with the appropriate grip size. And you also need to represent it as having a certain weight, otherwise you would not know what force you need to exert when lifting it.​[9]​ My claim is that these properties are represented unconsciously. 

3. Pragmatic representations are not normally accessible to introspection 
Consider the following short but impressive demonstration of perceptual learning.​[10]​ We are asked to put on a pair of distorting goggles that shifts everything we see to the left. Then we are supposed to throw a basketball into a basket in front of us. The first couple of attempts fail miserably: we throw the ball not towards the direction of the basket, but to the left of it. After a number of attempts, however, we do throw the ball accurately into the basket. 
But after having practised this for a couple of times with the goggles on, we are asked to take off the goggles and try to perform the task without them. And now we go through the same phenomenon again: when we first attempt to throw the ball towards the basket without the goggles, we miss it. After several attempts, we learn to throw it the way we did before putting on the goggles. 
I would like to focus on this change in our perception and action after taking off the goggles. At the beginning of the learning process, my pragmatic representation is clearly different from my pragmatic representation at the end, when I can successfully throw the ball into the basket. My pragmatic representation changes during this process and it is this change that allows me to perform the action successfully at the end of the process. The mental state that guides my action at the end of the process does so much more efficiently than the one that guides my action at the beginning. 
Here is how we can make sense of this phenomenon: our pragmatic representation attributes a certain location property to the basket, which enables and guides us to execute the action of throwing the ball in the basket. And our conscious perceptual experience attributes another location property to the basket. During the process of perceptual learning, the former representation changes, but the latter does not. 
Similar results are documented in the case of a number of optical illusions that mislead our perceptual experience but not our pragmatic representation. One such example is the three-dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion. The two-dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion is a simple optical illusion. A circle that is surrounded by smaller circles looks larger than a circle of the same size that is surrounded by larger circles. The three-dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion reproduces this illusion in space: a poker-chip surrounded by smaller poker-chips appears to be larger than a poker-chip of the same diameter surrounded by larger ones. The surprising finding is that although our perceptual experience is incorrect—we experience the first chip to be larger than the second one—if we are asked to pick up one of the chips, our grip-size is hardly influenced by the illusion (Aglioti et al. 1995, see also Milner and Goodale 1995, Chapter 6 and Goodale and Milner 2004). Similar results can be reproduced in the case of other optical illusions, like the Müller-Lyer illusion (Goodale & Humphrey 1998, Gentilucci et al. 1996, Daprati & Gentilucci 1997, Bruno 2001), the ‘Kanizsa compression illusion’ (Bruno & Bernardis 2002), the dot-in-frame illusion (Bridgeman et al., 1997), the Ponzo illusion (Jackson and Shaw 2000, Gonzalez et al. 2008) and the ‘hollow face illusion’ (Króliczak et al. 2006).​[11]​ 
In the case of the three-dimensional Ebbinghaus illusion, our pragmatic representation attributes a size-property to the chip and our conscious perceptual experience attributes another size-property to it. Our conscious perceptual experience misrepresents, but the pragmatic representation represents the size of the chip (more or less) correctly. 
Thus, we have two different mental states in this scenario: a conscious, incorrect one and a pragmatic representation, which is more or less correct. They are both representations: they both attribute properties to the same object. But they attribute different properties. The conscious experience attributes the size property we experience the chip as having. And the pragmatic representation attributes the size property that guides our (successful) action.​[12]​ 
Importantly, given that we have a conscious and incorrect representation at the same time as we have a (more or less) correct pragmatic representation of the same properties of the same object, this pragmatic representation must be unconscious. Our conscious perceptual experience attributes a certain size-property to the chip, but our pragmatic representation attributes another size-property—it can only do so unconsciously. Hence, pragmatic representations are (normally) unconscious. 
We need to be careful about what is meant by unconscious here. Do these states lack phenomenal consciousness or access-consciousness (Block 1995)? Is it visual awareness or visual attention that is missing (Lamme 2003)? Luckily, we do not have to engage with the Byzantine details of these distinctions. What matters for the purposes of my argument is that pragmatic representations are not accessible to introspection. When we are grasping the chips in the three-dimensional Ebbinghaus scenario, we have no introspective access to the representation that guides our action and that represents the size of the chip (more or less) correctly. We have only introspective access to the conscious perceptual experience that represents the size of the chip incorrectly. Pragmatic representations are not normally accessible to introspection. 
As a final objection, I said that pragmatic representations are not normally accessible to introspection. But am I justified to use the word normally here? Couldn’t one argue that the scenarios I analyzed are the ‘abnormal’ ones? I don’t think so. Here is a so-far-unmentioned body of empirical evidence that demonstrates this. If the location (or some other relevant property) of the target of our reaching or grasping actions suddenly changes, the trajectory and/or velocity of our movement changes very quickly (in less than 100 ms) afterwards. The change in our movement is unconscious: subjects do not notice this change and as it occurs within 100 ms of the change in the target’s location, this time is not enough for the information to reach consciousness (Paulignan et al. 1991, Pelisson et al. 1986, Goodale, Pelisson and Prablanc 1986, see also Brogaard 2011). In short, the subjects’ pragmatic representation changes as the target’s location changes, but this change is not available to introspection. And this is true of all actions that require micro-adjustments to our ongoing action, which means it is true of most of our perceptually-guided actions (see also Schnall et al. 2010 for some further structurally similar cases). 

4. Conclusion: To naturalize or not to naturalize
If the argument I presented above is correct, then pragmatic representations are not normally accessible to introspection. Now we can use this argument to conclude the necessity of naturalizing action theory. 
If we accept that pragmatic representations are not normally accessible to introspection, then we have a straightforward argument for the need to naturalize action theory. If the representational component of the immediate mental antecedent of action is not normally available to introspection, then introspection obviously cannot deliver any reliable evidence about it. 
Introspection, of course, may not be the only alternative to scientific evidence. There may be other genuinely-philosophical ways in which we can acquire information about a mental state: folk psychology, ordinary-language analysis, conceptual analysis, etc. But note that none of these philosophical methods are in a position to say much about pragmatic representations. Pragmatic representations are not part of our folk psychology—as we have seen. When we think about other people’s mental states, we think about their beliefs, desires and wishes, and not so much about the ways in which their perceptual system represents the shape properties of the objects in front of them. Similarly, talk about pragmatic representations is not part of our ordinary language—ordinary language analysis will not get us far. How about conceptual analysis? Arguably, the generation of action theorists that gave us the distinction between the cognitive and conative components of the immediate mental antecedents of action (Brand 1984, Bach 1978) did use conceptual analysis, or, more precisely, some version of a transcendental argument: we need to postulate this distinction in order to explain a number of odd features of our behavior. I see nothing wrong with this approach, but it has its limits. We can, and should, postulate certain mental states, more specifically, pragmatic representations, in order to be able to explain some features of our goal-directed actions, but postulating is only the first step. The real work is in figuring out what these representations are, what properties they represent objects as having, how they interact, or fail to interact, with the rest of our mind, etc. And this is something that conceptual analysis is unlikely to be able to do. 
Hence, it seems that the only way to find out more about pragmatic representations is by means of empirical research. We have no other option but to turn to the empirical sciences if we want to characterize and analyze them. And as pragmatic representations are the representational components of what makes actions actions, this means that we have no other option but to turn to the empirical sciences if we want to understand what actions are.​[13]​ Relying on empirical evidence is not a nice, optional feature of action theory: it is the only way action theory can proceed. 
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^1	  Various bits of the arguments in this chapter are also presented in Nanay 2013a, especially in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4. 
^2	  A notable exception is the recent philosophical literature on the ‘illusion of free will’: the sense of agency and conscious will (see, e.g., Libet 1985, Wegner 2002, Haggard and Clark 2003, Pacherie 2007). It is important to acknowledge that experimental philosophers do use empirical data on our intuitions about actions and our way of talking about them. But even experimental philosophers of action tend to ignore empirical findings about action itself (as opposed to our intuitions about it).
^3	  One important example comes from Fred Dretske’s work. The original link between perception and knowledge is at least partly due to the works of Fred Dretske over the decades (starting with Dretske 1969). Dretske’s recent writings, however, turn the established connection between perception and knowledge on its head. He is interested in what we perceive, and some of the considerations he uses in order to answer this question are about what we know (see Dretske 2007, 2010). Dretske’s work exemplifies a more general point about the shift of emphasis in contemporary philosophy of perception.
^4	  I am using here the widely accepted way of referring to natural kinds as the real joints of nature because it is a convenient rhetorical device, but I have my reservations about the very concept, for a variety of reasons (see Nanay 2010b, 2013c). 
^5	  The literature is too large to survey, but an important and philosophically-sensitive, example is Jeannerod (1997).
^6	  Theories of ‘agent causation’ deny this and claim that what distinguishes actions and bodily movements is that the former are caused by the agent herself (and not a specific mental state of her). I leave these accounts aside because of the various criticisms of the very idea of agent causation (see Pereboom 2004 for a summary). 
^7	  This list is supposed to be representative, not complete. Another important concept that may also be listed here in John Perry’s concept of ‘belief-how’ (Israel et al 1993, Perry, 2001). 
^8	  Sometimes they don’t come apart; the action of Anarchic Hand Syndrome patients could, for example, be analyzed as actions where the representational component of the immediate mental antecedent of actions is present, but the ‘moving to act’ component is absent: what moves these patients to act is something external. The same may be true of some actions of healthy adult humans as well. Elsewhere, I call these actions where one of the two components of the immediate mental antecedents of action is missing ‘semi-actions’ (Nanay 2013a). 
^9	  Are these all the properties pragmatic representations represent? Can they also represent the goal state of the action? Some philosophers take the representational component of the immediate mental antecedent to be the representation of the goal of the action (see, for example, Millikan 2004, Butterfill and Sinigaglia forthcoming). I myself think that while these goal states can be represented, then do not need to be represented in order for the action to be performed. But the argument I will present in the next section can be adjusted to apply to this ‘goal-state-representation’ way of thinking about pragmatic representations as well. 
^10	  This interactive demonstration can be found in a number of science exhibitions. I first saw it at the San Francisco Exploratorium. See also Held (1965) for the same phenomenon in an experimental context. 
^11	  I will focus on the three-dimensional Ebbinghaus illiusion because of the simplicity of the results, but it needs to be noted that the experimental conditions of this experiment have been criticized recently. The main line of criticism is that experimental design of the grasping experiment and the perceptual judgment experiment is very different. When the subjects grasp the middle chip, there is only one middle chip, surrounded by either smaller or larger chips. When they are judging the size of the middle chip, however, they are comparing two chips—one surrounded by smaller chips, the other by larger ones (Pavani et al. 1999, Franz 2001, 2003, Franz et al. 2000, 2003, see also Gillam 1998, Vishton 2004 and Vishton and Fabre 2003, but see Haffenden & Goodale 1998 and Haffenden et al. 2001 for a response). See Briscoe (2008) for a good philosophically-sensitive overview on this question. I focus on the three-dimensional Ebbinghaus experiment in spite of these worries, but those who are moved by Franz et al. style considerations can substitute some other visual illusion, namely, the Müller-Lyer illusion, the Ponzo illusion, the hollow face illusion or the Kanizsa compression illusion, where there is evidence that the illusion influences our perceptual judgments, but not our perceptually-guided actions. 
^12	  There is a lot of empirical data in favor of the existence of two more or less separate visual subsystems that may explain the presence of these two different representations here (Milner-Goodale 1995, Goodale-Milner 2004, Jacob-Jeannerod 2003, Jeannerod 1997). The dorsal visual subsystem is (normally) unconscious and is responsible for the perceptual guidance of our actions. The ventral visual subsystem, in contrast, is (normally) conscious and is responsible for categorization and identification. I do not want to rely on this distinction in my argument (partly because of the emerging evidence of the interactions between the two subsystems, partly because of the debate about whether and in what extent the dorsal stream needs to be unconscious, see Dehaene et al. 1998, Clark 2001, Brogaard 2011, forthcoming, Briscoe 2008, 2009, Milner-Goodale 2008, Jeannerod-Jacob 2004, Goodale 2011, Clark 2009, Kravitz et al. 2011). But one consequence of my argument is that if we are to naturalize action theory, the empirical data on dorsal perception will be of special importance.
^13	  I have been focusing on the representational component of the mental antecedent of actions—pragmatic representations—, and argued that they are not normally accessible to introspection. But it may be worth noting that, arguably, the other, ‘moving us to act’ or ‘conative’ component of the mental antecedent of actions is not normally accessible to introspection either. Here is a nice literary example by Robert Musil: I have never caught myself in the act of willing. It was always the case that I saw only the thought—for example when I’m lying on one side in bed: now you ought to turn yourself over. This thought goes marching on in a state of complete equality with a whole set of other ones: for example, your foot is starting to feel stiff, the pillow is getting hot, etc. It is still a proper act of reflection; but it is still far from breaking out into a deed. On the contrary, I confirm with a certain consternation that, despite these thoughts, I still haven’t turned over. As I admonish myself that I ought to do so and see that this does not happen, something akin to depression takes possession of me, albeit a depression that is at once scornful and resigned. And then, all of a sudden, and always in an unguarded moment, I turn over. As I do so, the first thing that I am conscious of is the movement as it is actually being performed, and frequently a memory that this started out from some part of the body or other, from the feet, for example, that moved a little, or were unconsciously shifted, from where they had been lying, and that they then drew all the rest after them (Robert Musil: Diaries. New York: Basic Books, 1999, p. 101. See also Goldie 2004, pp. 97-98).
